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NO RESCUE IN SIGHT FOR WARSAW PLAINTIFFS
FROM EITHER COURTS OR LEGISLATURE -




CRITICS HAVE CONDEMNED the long-standing War-
saw Convention' for years, calling it heinous, absurd,
archaic, outmoded, and outrageous.2 Yet, the 1929 treaty
regulating international air travel, to which one hundred
thirty nations subscribe,3 remains the most widely ad-
hered to treaty in the world.4 The focus of the outcry in
the United States against the treaty has been the low lia-
bility limit for personal injury.
The Warsaw Convention, as modified by the 1966 Mon-
treal Agreement, 5 currently establishes a liability limit of
$75,000 per passenger for personal injury or death aris-
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, reprinted in note
following 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 at 743 (1988) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
2 Marc S. Moller, The Warsaw Convention: A Continuing Dilemma For International
Aviation, 63 LAw INST. J. 1040, 1041 (Nov. 1989); Ernest F. Hollings, Defeat of the
Montreal Protocols: Victory for Airline Passengers, TRIAL, May 1983, at 20; Lee S. Krein-
dler, The Pan Am 103 Atrocity, LLOYD's AVIATION L., Mar. 15, 1989, at 1, 3.
S Montreal Protocols Have Better Chance of Approval This Year, AVIATION DAILY, May
24, 1990, at 376.
4 Lee S. Kreindler, Warsaw Convention: An Anachronism, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1988,
at 3.
5 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol, CAB Agreement 18900, reprinted in note following 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1502 at 748 (1988) (approved by CAB Order E-23680, May 13, 1966, 31
Fed. Reg. 7302) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
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ing from an accident on board an international aircraft.6
Today in the United States, the harshness of the low limit
in modern economic terms and recent judicial decisions
strictly enforcing the $75,000 cap combine to create new
pressures for change.7 The form of that change is the
subject of ongoing debate and of this comment.
On January 29, 1991, the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the United States Senate of the 102d Congress
voted to report favorably to the Senate Montreal Protocol
3 and the Supplemental Compensation Plan, the latest at-
tempt to raise the liability limit.8 But, in spite of pressure
from Department of Transportation Secretary Andrew
Card, the Protocols did not go before the Senate for a
vote before the 102d Congress adjourned. 9 Montreal
6 Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered
by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.
The Montreal Agreement adds:
By this agreement, the parties thereto bind themselves to include in
their tariffs, effective May 16, 1966, a special contract in accordance
with Article 22(1) of the Convention or the Protocol providing for a
limit of liability for each passenger for death, wounding, or other
bodily injury of $75,000 inclusive of legal fees, and, in case of a
claim brought in a State where provision is made for separate award
of legal fees and costs, a limit of $58,000 exclusive of legal fees and
costs.
Montreal Agreement, supra note 5, at 748.
7 See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, 928 F.2d
1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991) (punitive damages are not avail-
able under the Warsaw Convention regardless of willful misconduct); Eastern Air-
lines v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991) (Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention allows
no recovery of mental or psychic injuries without accompanying physical injury);
Chan v. Korean Airlines, 490 U.S. 122 (1989) (failure to provide 10-point type
notice does not defeat liability limits under Warsaw Convention).
8 Montreal Protocol 3 and the Supplemental Compensation Plan, LLOYD'S AVIATION L.,
Feb. 15, 1991, at 5. The vote was 13 to 2. Senators voting for the Protocol were
Pell, Dodd, Kerry, Robb, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Sarbanes, Pressler, Murkow-
ski, McConnell, Cranston, and Mack; voting against were Biden and Simon. Id.
9 DOT Makes Last Minute Plea on Montreal Protocols, AVIATION DAILY, Sept. 28,
1992, at 539. Secretary Card threatened to recommend to the President that the
United States renounce the Warsaw Convention if no action were taken on the
Protocols. In stressing the need for prompt action on the Protocols, Card said, "if
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Protocol 3 would raise the liability limit for personal in-
jury or death to approximately $130,000 per passenger,
and the Supplemental Compensation Plan would add
damages up to $500 million per aircraft in separate insur-
ance coverage funded by a mandatory surcharge on tick-
ets for international flights, which is currently estimated
to cost between $2 and $5 per ticket.'0
This comment briefly reviews the history of the Warsaw
Convention and various attempts at its modification, ex-
amines judicial decisions applying its provisions in the
area of personal injury or death, and concludes with a dis-
cussion of Montreal Protocol 3 in its current embodiment
and a consideration of its potential impact on future
cases. Section II presents the historical background of the
Warsaw Convention, its original purposes, and a series of
subsequent attempts to modify its provisions. A survey of
judicial applications of the Warsaw Convention and of at-
tempts by plaintiffs to avoid the liability limits follows in
Section III. Section IV summarizes the currently pro-
posed, but stalled, Montreal Protocol 3, which provides
for a supplemental compensation plan to be funded by a
mandatory surcharge on tickets purchased for interna-
tional travel. The conclusion considers the current status
of the Warsaw Convention liability limit and viable op-
tions for change.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. THE WARSAW CONVENTION (1929)
The Multilateral Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air
was signed in Warsaw, Poland, in 1929, and is known as
the Senate does not approve ratification of the Protocols prior to the end of the
present Congress, the utility of the Warsaw Convention regime will almost cer-
tainly come to an end." Id. Card summarized the problem by stating, "It would
be unconscionable, in my view, to maintain the requirement that claimants and
their lawyers spend years in expensive litigation trying to prove 'willful miscon-
duct' on the part of an airline simply to qualify for damages in excess of $75,000."
Id.
10 Montreal Protocol 3, LLOYD'S AVIATION L., May 15, 1990, at 1.
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the Warsaw Convention." The purposes of the Conven-
tion were to establish uniformity in the international avia-
tion industry with respect to tickets, airbills, and ways of
dealing with legal claims and to protect the infant airline
industry by providing limited liability for accidents.'
Critics point out that, today, more than sixty years later,
the mature airline industry no longer needs such protec-
tion,'" and that international uniformity on recoverable
damages is neither a desirable nor practical goal.' 4
A preliminary conference in Paris in 1925 created the
Comite International Technique d'Experts Juridique Aer-
iens (CITEJA), whose work led to the 1929 conference in
Warsaw.' 5 By February 13, 1933, the required minimum
number of nations had ratified the treaty, which then en-
tered into force.' 6 The United States joined the treaty on
July 31, 1934, following advice and consent by the Senate
and proclamation by President Roosevelt.' 7
B. ARTICLES OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The Warsaw Convention applies to "all international
transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed
by aircraft for hire.' 8 The Convention defines "interna-
tional transportation" to include trips between two par-
ties to the treaty or a trip with departure and destination
points within a nation party to the treaty, but with an in-
terim stop in another sovereign nation.' 9
11 LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL
HANDBOOK 3 (1988).
12 Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498-99 (1967).
Is Kreindler, supra note 4, at 5.
14 George N. Tompkins, The Montreal Protocols: What Happens Next?, BRIEF, Aug.
1983, at 29.
15 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 12, at 498.
16 Id. at 501-02. Spain, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Romania, France, Poland, Latvia,
Great Britain and Italy were the first nations to ratify the Convention. Id.
17 Id. at 502.
'a Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
'9 Id. art. 1(2). The article provides the following coverage:
For the purposes of this Convention the expression "international
transportation" shall mean any transportation in which, according to
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Article 3 requires carriers to deliver passenger tickets
stating the place and date of issue, place of departure and
destination, stopping places, name and address of carrier,
and notice of the liability limitation. 20  Article 3 further
provides that failure to deliver the prescribed ticket to a
passenger will result in the carrier's loss of the protective
liability limit.2'
Article 17 defines the elements necessary to establish a
presumption of carrier liability for personal injury or
death of a passenger,22 and article 22(1) sets the liability
limit. 23 The original limit was set at 125,000 Poincare
the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the
place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the transpor-
tation or a transshipment are situated either within the territories of
two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High
Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a terri-
tory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of
another Power, even though that Power is not a party to this Con-
vention. Transportation without such an agreed stopping place be-
tween territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or
authority of the same High Contracting Party shall not be deemed to
be international for the purposes of this Convention.
Id.
20 Id. art. 3(1).
21 Id. art. 3(2). Article 3(2) provides:
The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not
affect the existence or the validity of the contract of transportation,
which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this convention.
Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger
ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself
of those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his
liability.
ld.
I22 Id. art. 17. Article 17 states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered
by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking.
Id.
23 Id. art. 22(1). Article 22(1) states:
In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier 'for
each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where,
in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submit-
ted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical payments,
the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not exceed
750 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
francs, amounting to $8,300.4 Article 25 permits the
avoidance of the liability limitation if the carrier or its
agent is guilty of "willful misconduct. 25
The passenger faces a formidable task to avoid the Con-
vention liability limit. If the case is a cause of action
under the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff must show
either 1) the event was not an accident, 2) the victim was
not a passenger under Article 1, 3) the carrier did not de-
liver a ticket with proper notice under Article 3, or 4) the
carrier or its agent committed willful misconduct under
Article 25.26 If the plaintiff fails by these means to avoid
the Convention, not only does the liability cap of $75,000
apply, but also the recovery is limited to certain damages.
If the case is taken outside the Convention limits, the
plaintiff must then proceed under general tort principles,
which require proof of negligence, a difficult task that the
Convention does not require.2 7 The plaintiff confronts a
dilemma of whether to face the Convention's liability
limit or attempt to win the case under a negligence
theory.28
C. THE HAGUE PROTOCOL (1955)
Controversy regarding the Warsaw Convention erupted
soon after its enactment. 29 The dissatisfaction focused on
the liability limit.3 0  In 1955 a conference convened at
The Hague for the purpose of amending the Warsaw
Convention.3  Delegates discussed two possibilities:
125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and
the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
Id. Article 18 covers liability for loss or damage to baggage and Article 22(2) sets
the baggage liability limitations. Id. arts. 18, 21(2). Liability for baggage is not
within the subject matter of this comment.
24 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 12, at 499.
25 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 25(1), 25(2).
26 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 11, at 55.
27 Id.
28 Id.
- Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 12, at 502.
10 Id. at 504.
31 Id. at 504-05.
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more narrowly defining conditions under which the limit
applied or raising the limit.3 2  The Hague Protocol
doubled the liability limit for passengers to $16,600." In
addition, due to pressure from the United States delega-
tion, a provision allowing courts to award court costs and
legal fees according to local law was tacked on to Article
22." Also, in an attempt to clarify the term "willful mis-
conduct," which was undefined in the Warsaw Conven-
tion, the conference agreed the liability limit could be
avoided if the damage was caused by an act "done with
intent to cause damage or recklessly and with the knowl-
edge that damage would probably result. ' 35 President Ei-
senhower finally submitted the Hague Protocol to the
Senate in 1959,36 but the United States never ratified the
attempted modification because it thought the limit was
too low.
3 7
D. NOTICE OF DENUNCIATION BY THE UNITED STATES
(1965)
Two air crashes to which the Warsaw Convention liabil-
ity limitation applied helped stall Senate consideration of
the Hague Protocol.38 In addition, courts in the United
States were now applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
32 Id. at 505.
33 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 11, at 96. The problem of how to value compensa-
tion in an international setting continues to plague attempted modifications to the
Warsaw Convention. The Warsaw Convention used the Poincare franc, the
French gold franc, in an attempt to avoid effects of devaluation if local currency
were used. By 1934, the 125,000 FP equalled $10,000 due to an increase in the
value of gold. The Hague Protocol referred only to a "currency unit," deleting
reference to the French franc. The Montreal Agreement of 1966 specified the
amount in U.S. dollars. The Guatemala Protocol used the French franc again.
The Montreal Protocols, not yet in effect, propose using a Special Drawing Right
(SDR), which is based on the currency of five major nations. Id. at 96-97.
34 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 12, at 508.
-5 David Cohen, Montreal Protocol: The Most Recent Attempt to Modify the Warsaw
Convention, 8 AIR L. 146, 152 (1983).
36 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 12, at 515.
37 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 11, at 96.
38 Cohen, supra note 35, at 153-54. Sixty-six people died in a United Airlines
crash in Wyoming in 1955 and in 1960 thirty-seven people died in an Avianca
crash in Jamaica. Id. at 153-54, n.97.
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aid plaintiffs in proving negligence in a wide variety of sit-
uations, including aircraft accidents, 9 which reduced the
need to rely on the Convention's presumption of liability
in Article 17. In 1961, the Department of State asked the
Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA) to
examine the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol
as they related to the United States at that time and to
make recommendations.4 0 The combination of the low li-
ability limit and the development of res ipsa loquitur stimu-
lated calls for denunciation of the Convention.4 ' The
IGIA tried to appease opponents of the Convention and
the Hague Protocol by obtaining an agreement from the
airlines to voluntarily increase their liability limits.4 2 Arti-
cle 22 of the Convention43 offered an alternative. The lia-
bility limit can be raised by special agreement between the
carrier and passenger.44 The IGIA proposed to repre-
sentatives of the five major American airlines and the Air
Transport Association (ATA) in August 1965 that the car-
riers waive their limit up to $100,000. 4 5 No agreement re-
sulted, as four of the airlines indicated the highest limit
they might consider would be $50,000, and Pan American
insisted the agreement be an international one, including
39 Id. at 154. Conditions necessary to the application of res ipsa loquitur (the
event "speaks for itself"), permitting an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant, include: 1) the event ordinarily would not occur without someone's
negligence, 2) the agency or instrumentality was within the exclusive control of
the defendant, and 3) the plaintiff did not voluntarily contribute in any way to the
cause of the event. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 39, at 244 (5th ed. 1984). Since an airline accident does not ordinarily
happen in the absence of negligence and the aircraft is under the control of the
defendant carrier, the doctrine applies.
40 Department of State Pub. Notice 196, 26 Fed. Reg. 9684 (1961), 45 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 692 (1961).
41 Cohen, supra note 35, at 154. A party may denounce the Warsaw Convention
by written notification to the Government of the Republic of Poland. Six months
after notification the denunciation shall take effect. Warsaw Convention, supra
note 1, art. 39. To denounce a treaty means "the act of one nation in giving
notice to another nation of its intention to terminate an existing treaty between
the two nations." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990).
42 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 12, at 547.
41 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22.
44 Id.
4- Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 12, at 547.
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46both foreign and domestic carriers. In September 1965,
the International Air Transport Association (IATA) dis-
tributed a mail ballot and obtained the agreement of its
members to raise the liability limit to $50,000 per passen-
ger.4 7 The agreement was conditioned, however, on the
United States' ratification of the Hague Protocol, a fact
not mentioned in the IATA press release.4"
The United States considered the resulting agreement
to be insufficient, and on November 15, 1965, the United
States gave formal notice of its denunciation of the War-
saw Convention, to take effect in six months.49 The press
release announcing the notice of denunciation also an-
nounced the willingness of the United States to withdraw
the notice if the international air carriers could agree to a
temporary $75,000 liability limit, with a prospect of a later
agreement of a $100,000 ceiling.50
E. THE MONTREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT (1966)
The threatened denunciation by the United States of
the Warsaw Convention resulted in raising liability limits
of airline carriers to $75,000 per passenger in the Mon-
treal interim agreement. 5  The $75,000 limit includes
legal fees and costs, whereas in countries where legal fees
and costs are awarded separately, the limit is $58,000.52
The struggle to arrive at this "interim" agreement in-
volved many organizations over a period of several
months. Fifty-nine nations were represented at the Mon-
treal Conference in February 1966. Initially they could
not agree on a liability limit, on whether absolute liability
should apply, or whether legal fees should be included. 3
46 Id. at 547-48.
47 Id. at 549.
48 Id. at 549 n.175 (citing $50,000 Liability Voted by Airlines, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
1965, at 93 col. 1).
49 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923-24 (1965); C.A.B. Order E-22984, Dec. 15, 1965.
50 53 DEP'T ST. BULL. 923-24 (1965).
51 Montreal Agreement, supra note 5.
52 Id.
53 Montreal Proceedings (ICAO, Special ICAO Meeting on Limits for Passengers
Under the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol) (1966). Proposals
1993] 753
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When the international conference failed to produce an
agreement, the United States proposed a $75,000 limit
with absolute liability as a basis for a temporary agree-
ment.54 The IATA worked to get agreements from its
member carriers and by April 27, 1966, announced that
only three IATA member airlines (all American) had re-
jected the proposal, and only four foreign airlines had not
yet accepted it. 55 Despite strong opposition to the abso-
lute liability provision of the proposal by the American
Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA),56 Senator Robert
Kennedy,57 and the Air Line Pilots Association,58 the
State Department announced on May 13, 1966 its accept-
ance of the proposal (now called the IATA proposal) and
on May, 14, 1966 its withdrawal of denunciation of the
Warsaw Convention. 59  The Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) at the same time announced its approval of the
agreement. 60 The airlines had finally agreed to accept ab-
solute liability, waiving Article 20 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion as a defense.6'
The third provision in the Montreal Agreement, which
until recently led to some plaintiffs' successful avoidance
of the liability limitations, requires 10-point type notice of
the limits on passenger tickets. 62 This notice is to be cop-
ranged from the Czech Proposal to increase liability to $33,200 under Warsaw/
Hague to the joint proposal by Germany, New Zealand, Sweden, and Jamaica for a
limit of $75,000 without absolute liability. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note
12, at 574.
51 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 12, at 588.
55 Id. at 591.
56 George Home, Lawyers Protest Air Liability Plan, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 1966, at
62, col. 1.
57 112 Cong. Rec. 8920 (1966).
58 Liability Per Passenger Upped to $75,000 for World Flights, WASH. POST, May 1,
1966, at A-3, col. 6.
59 54 DEP'T ST. BULL. 955-57 (1966).
6 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
6! GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 11, at 85. Article 20(1) allows a complete defense if
the carrier or its agents can prove it took "all necessary measures to avoid the
damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures." War-
saw Convention, supra, note 1, art. 20.
62 Montreal Agreement, supra note 5.
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ied verbatim from the agreement.6 3
Although viewed as an interim agreement only and pri-
marily designed to prevent the denunciation by the
United States from going into effect, the Montreal Agree-
ment and its provisions are still in effect today. The
Agreement is actually a private contract between the air-
lines and passengers as provided in Article 22(1) of the
Warsaw Convention. 64
F. THE GUATEMALA PROTOCOL (1971)
Continued efforts by the United States to address the
problem of the liability limit led to a conference in Guate-
mala City in 1971.65 The resulting Guatemala Protocol
66
63 Id. Advice to International Passengers on Limitation of Liability.
Passengers on a journey involving an ultimate destination or a stop
in a country other than the country of origin are advised that the
provisions of a treaty known as the Warsaw Convention may be ap-
plicable to the entire journey, including any portion entirely within
the country of origin or destination. For such passengers on a jour-
ney to, from, or with an agreed stopping place in the United States
of America, the Convention and special contracts of carriage embod-
ied in applicable tariffs provide that the liability of certain carriers,
parties to such special contracts for death of or personal injury to
passengers, is limited in most cases to proven damages not to ex-
ceed U.S. $75,000 per passenger, and that this liability shall not de-
pend on the negligence of the carrier. The limit of liability of U.S.
$75,000 is inclusive of legal fees and costs except that in case of a
claim brought in a country where provision is made for separate
award of legal fees and costs, the limits shall be the sum of U.S.
$58,000 exclusive of legal fees and costs. For such passengers trav-
eling by a carrier not a party to such special contracts or on a jour-
ney not to, from, or having an agreed stopping place in the United
States of America, liability of the carrier for death or personal injury
is limited in most cases to approximately U.S. $10,000 or U.S.
$20,000. The names of the carriers who are parties to such con-
tracts, are available at all ticket offices of such carriers and may be
examined on request. Additional protection can usually be obtained
by purchasing insurance from a private company. Such insurance is
not affected by any limitation of the carrier's liability under the War-
saw Convention or special contracts of carriage. For further informa-
tion please consult your airline or insurance company
representative.
Id.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22.
65 Nicolas M. Matte, The Warsaw System and the Hesitations of the U.S. Senate, 8
ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 151, 157 (1983).
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provides for 1) a liability limitation based on Poincare
francs to a maximum of approximately $120,000; 2) peri-
odic revision of the liability limit; 3) absolute liability for
death or personal injury; 4) permission for a supplemen-
tal national insurance plan; and 5) a settlement induce-
ment clause, calling for the imposition of attorney's fees
on the carrier if it wrongfully fails to settle within a rea-
sonable time, as specified in the protocol.67 Even though
the provisions were aimed at satisfying the complaints of
the United States, the Nixon administration never sought
the advice and consent of the Senate for ratification of the
Guatemala Protocol. 68 The Nixon administration ob-
jected to expressing the liability limit in terms of gold be-
cause of the great flucutation of gold prices at that time.69
G. THE MONTREAL PROTOCOLS (1975)
The next significant effort to modify the Warsaw Con-
vention occurred at a diplomatic conference in Montreal
in 1975, where international delegates replaced the gold
standard with Special Drawing Rights (SDR). 70 The Inter-
national Monetary Fund determines the SDR, a unit of
currency based on the currencies of France, Britain, Ja-
pan, Germany, and the United States. Montreal Protocol
3 called for 100,000 SDR, which in 1983 was approxi-
mately $120,000 per passenger, 7' and today is worth
about $132,000.72
The protocol also provided for a passenger-funded
Supplemental Compensation Plan (SCP). 73 Passengers
66 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as
Amended by the Protocol Done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, signed at
Guatemala City on 8 March 1971, ICAO Doc. 8932/3, reprinted in GOLDHIRSCH,
supra note 11, at 319.
67 Matte, supra note 65, at 157.
66 Id. at 158.
69 Id.
70 Id.
7' GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 11, at 97.
72 Matte, supra note 65, at 158.
11 Lee S. Kreindler, The Montreal Protocols in New Form, N.Y. L.J., June 4, 1990, at
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would be required to pay a surcharge to fund additional
insurance coverage providing up to $200,000 per passen-
ger beyond the Convention limitation.74 In addition, the
protocol eliminated the willful misconduct provision in
Article 65 of the Warsaw Convention,75 removing one of
the plaintiff's means of circumventing the liability
limitation.76
The protocol was stalled for seven years in the United
States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and finally
went before the Senate in 1983. 7 The Senate refused to
give its advice and consent to the Montreal Protocol.7 8
In a political maneuver to save the protocol at least
temporarily, Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. changed his
vote to "nay" so he would have standing to enter a mo-
tion for reconsideration. 79 As a result of Baker's action,
the protocol was voted out of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee in both 1990 and 1991 but is still alive. 80
In both the 101st and 102nd sessions of Congress, the full
Senate failed to consider the revised protocol, thus leav-
ing the 1966 Montreal Interim Agreement liability limit of
$75,000 intact and postponing consideration of the proto-
col on the Senate floor yet another year.
The history of the Warsaw Convention and the various
attempts at its modification or revision demonstrate that
those who seek to abolish the liability limitation have been
3. Montreal Protocol 4 deals with liability for baggage, not a subject of this
comment.
74 Moller, supra note 2, at 1041.
75 Id.
76 Id. Article 25(1) states:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of
this Convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is
caused by his willful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in
accordance with the law of the Court to which the case is submitted,
is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 25.
77 Tompkins, supra note 14, at 26.
78 The vote took place on March 9, 1983, with the following results: 50 "yea,"
42 "nay," and 7 not voting. Id.
79 Id.
80 Montreal Protocol 3 and the Supplemental Compensation Plan, supra note 8, at 5.
1993] 757
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instrumental in retaining the low limitation. By insisting
that no limit should apply, opponents do not allow the
out-of-date limit to rise to a more appropriate level. Even
attorneys who support the scheme provided in the War-
saw Convention as modified by the Montreal Agreement
readily admit that $75,000 is inadequate compensation to-
day. " ' While opponents of the Convention rail against
even the idea of a liability limit and advocate outright de-
nunciation of the system by the United States, they op-
pose efforts to raise the liability limit to a more
conscionable level as an intermediary stopgap. 82 Mon-
treal Protocol 3 in its modified form providing for a liabil-
ity limit of approximately $130,000 per passenger per
incident and the Supplemental Compensation Plan pro-
viding additional insurance coverage of up to
$500,000,000 per incident per aircraft have been unable
to surmount hurdles necessary to gain full Senate consid-
eration despite the support of the Bush administration,
the Department of Transportation, the General Account-
ing Office, the American Bar Association, the Air Trans-
port Association, and the World Travel and Tourism
Council.83
The impact of this legislative inaction on victims of in-
ternational disasters is exacerbated by the judicial applica-
tion of the Warsaw Convention. Courts have found the
"I At the 25th Annual SMU Air Law Symposium, February 1991, Peter Martin,
in his speech entitled "A Different Perspective of Some Liability Aspects of Avia-
tion Terrorism," replying to well-known plaintiffs' attorney Lee S. Kreindler,
stated:
Most thinking air lawyers these days are agreed that the Warsaw
Convention system is out of date as to its limits. Opportunity after
opportunity for amendment has been missed. Guatemala is not in
force. Montreal 3 is not in force either. No obvious progress is be-
ing made on substantially increased special contract limits.
Peter Martin, Address at the 25th Annual SMU Air Law Symposium (Feb. 1991) (on
file with Journal of Air Law and Commerce).
82 See Kreindler, supra note 2, at 6; Hollings, supra note 2, at 24-25; Moller, supra
note 2, at 1041; Kreindler, supra note 4, at 3; Tompkins, supra note 14, at 29.
85 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MONTREAL AVIATION PROTOCOLS 3
AND 4: REPORT TOGETHER WITH MINORITY VIEWS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 1, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 22-24 (1991).
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Convention provides the exclusive remedy, have broadly
defined accident, have expansively viewed notice, have de-
nied all but actual damages, and have narrowly defined
willful misconduct to hold plaintiffs under the Warsaw
Convention and to apply the liability limitations of Article
22(1).
III. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF LIABILITY
LIMITATIONS
A study of American judicial application of the personal
injury and death liability limitations of the Warsaw Con-
vention reveals a growing trend toward strict application.
Until recent United States Supreme Court decisions aris-
ing from the 1983 Korean Airlines 747 shot down over
the Soviet Union 4 and the 1988 bombing of the Pan
American flight over Scotland, 5 many judges disfavored
the low liability limit and employed judicial means of cir-
cumventing the limit.8 6 These recent Supreme Court de-
cisions toughening the application of the Warsaw
Convention liability scheme as modified by the Montreal
Agreement may attract new attention to and debate over
the current limit of $75,000. The following discussion ex-
amines each of the means plaintiffs employ to avoid the
liability limitation and reveals how courts have closed the
doors to most of these attempts in recent cases.
A. CAUSE OF ACTION
The cause of action under which the plaintiff sues may
determine the jurisdiction of the court, the plaintiff's
standing to sue, and the damages available. Early cases
held that the Warsaw Convention did not give rise to an
- Chan v. Korean Airlines, 490 U.S. 122 (1989) (sustaining the liability limit
even though the carrier failed to provide notice of the limit in 10-point type, as
required in the Montreal Agreement).
-' In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
112 S. Ct. 331 (1991) (rejecting the recovery of punitive damages under the War-
saw Convention).
86 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 11, at 97.
87 Id. at 56.
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independent cause of action for personal injuries or
wrongful death incurred in an international air accident
and that the cause of action must arise from domestic
law.88
Overruling years of precedent, 89 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Benjamins v. British European Air-
ways 9° held that the Warsaw Convention does create a
cause of action for wrongful death and that federal district
courts do have jurisdiction. 9' The main impact of the de-
cision in Benjamins is that diversity requirements under 28
U.S.C. § 1332 are eliminated for federal court jurisdiction
under the court's interpretation of the Convention. The
court predicted that most cases arising under the Conven-
tion would meet diversity requirements for federal juris-
diction, but in cases where diversity was not present a
cause of action arose under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the
treaty provided the cause of action.92
Two groups of litigants benefit from the Benjamins deci-
sion: 1) aliens who could not satisfy the diversity require-
ments of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, but who satisfy the venue
requirements of Article 28 of the Convention;93 and 2)
United States citizens who are residents of the same state
as the defendant airline, and thus lack diversity.
Pointing out that courts in other signatories to the War-
88 See Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 679-80 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957); Komlos v. Compagnic Nationale Air France, 111 F.
Supp. 393, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954).
19 Both Noel, 247 F.2d at 679-80, and Komlos, Ill F. Supp. at 401, held the
Warsaw Convention did not create a cause of action. Interestingly, the same
judge wrote both the Noel opinion and the Benjamins opinion which overruled Noel.
9 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
91 Id. at 919.
92 Id.
's Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plain-
tiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either
before the Court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal
place of business, or where he has a place of business through which
the contract has been made, or before the Court at the place of
destination.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28.
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saw Convention had held that the Convention created a
cause of action, the court in Benjamins sought to bring the
United States into international conformity.94 The court
commented that federal courts were particularly suitable
forums for large air crash cases since they commonly han-
dled such complex litigation.95 The court, however, lim-
ited its holding to the Benjamins' case against the airline
and left the decision to the lower court as to whether to
take pendant jurisdiction over the suit against the
manufacturer. 96
Following Benjamins, courts addressed the issue of
whether the Convention created an exclusive cause of ac-
tion. A group of recent decisions arose from an Avianca
Boeing 707 flight en route from Columbia to New York
City which crashed on January 25, 1990, near Cove Neck,
New York, killing sixty-five passengers and injuring
eighty-four. 97  Several plaintiffs filed wrongful death
claims in Florida state court, and the defendant airline
sought to remove the case to federal court, claiming the
Warsaw Convention provided an exclusive cause of action
for accidents involving international travel.
In Velasquez v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia,9" the
United States district court in Florida pointed out that
cases have uniformly held that the Warsaw Convention
provides an exclusive cause of action for lost baggage and
damaged goods and that the majority of the courts have
found a similar exclusive cause of action with regard to
personal injury and death. 99 The court concluded, how-
ever, that federal and state courts had concurrent jurisdic-
tion.' 00 Thus, the plaintiff could choose to file in state
- 572 F.2d at 918-19.
q5 id. at 919.
6 Id.
97 Calderon v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, 929 F.2d 599 (11th Cir.
1991); Alvarez v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, 756 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Fla.
1991); Velasquez v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, 747 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Fla.
1990).
91 747 F. Supp. 670.
I ld. at 675-76.
1- Id. at 677.
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court, but the defendant could then remove to federal
court.10 1 Furthermore, the plaintiff need not bring a claim
under the Warsaw Convention for the Convention to ap-
ply since plaintiff had already pleaded a federal cause of
action.10 2 Therefore in this case, the court refused to re-
mand the case to state court.10 3
In direct opposition to the Velasquez decision, Judge
King, a United States district court judge in Florida, ruled
in Alvarez v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia that the Warsaw
Convention does not. create an exclusive cause of ac-
tion.' °4 In this case, he granted permission to remand a
case arising from the same accident as that in Valasquez. 0 5
Relying on Rhymes v. Arrow Air, Inc.,1 °6 a decision King
himself had written, Judge King acknowledged that the
Convention gives rise to a cause of action, but he rejected
the notion that it is an exclusive cause of action. 0 7 Never-
theless, continued the court, the Convention does provide
the exclusive remedy 0 8 so that the liability limitation ap-
plies regardless of the forum where the case is heard. To
date, the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled
on whether the Warsaw Convention provides an exclusive
cause of action.
B. ACCIDENT
If a passenger's injury or death does not result from an
accident while on board or while embarking or dis-
embarking from the aircraft, under Article 17 the passen-
ger may avoid the liability limitations by proving
negligence. The United States Supreme Court in Air
France v. Saks, 109 defined "accident" as an "unexpected or
10, Id.
102 Id. at 678.
os Id. at 679.
104 756 F. Supp. 550, 555 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
105 Id.
-0 636 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
107 756 F. Supp. at 554.
108 Id.
- 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
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unusual happening or event that is external to the passen-
ger."" 0 Thus, the plaintiff's loss of hearing, which re-
sulted from normal pressurization of the aircraft, was not
an accident, and Article 17 of the Convention did not ap-
ply."' Circuit and district courts have consistently held
that passengers' illnesses or physical injuries sustained or
aggravated during normal flight operations do not consti-
tute "accidents."' 12
A variety of events are "accidents" under the Warsaw
Convention as long as they occur on board or while em-
barking or disembarking. Both the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit' 13 and the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit" 4 have held that terrorist attacks are within
the definition of accident. A New York federal district
court held that a bomb threat was an accident,' and the
same court held that an accident occurred during a
hijacking." 6
The definition of accident also encompasses torts com-
mitted by fellow passengers. When a drunken passenger
fell and injured a fellow passenger, a Maryland federal
district court held an accident had occurred.' ' 7 Recently,
110 Id. at 405-06.
1 Id. at 406.
112 See Abramson v. Japan Airlines, Co., 739 F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985) (no accident when passenger, sitting on board the
aircraft, suffered a hernia relapse); MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402,
1404-05 (1st Cir. 1971) (no accident when passenger fell while waiting for lug-
gage); Margrave v. British Airways, 643 F. Supp. 510, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (no
accident when passenger suffers back injury as a result of prolonged sitting
aboard aircraft due to delay); Fischer v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 623 F. Supp.
1064, 1065 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (heart attack and death were not an accident when
they resulted from no unexpected event on the flight); Scherer v. Pan Am: World
Airways, 387 N.Y.S.2d 580, 581 (App. Div. 1970) (no accident when prolonged
sitting on aircraft aggravated passenger's thrombophlebitis).
I" Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 1977).
114 Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 890 (1976).
11 Salerno v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 656, 657 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
116 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1247-48 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
11 Oliver v. Scandinavian Airlines, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,283, 18,284 (Md. Apr.
5, 1983).
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a New York federal district court also included a slip and
fall accident under the Convention as long as it occurs
while on board or while embarking or disembarking." 8
C. PASSENGER
If the person injured or killed is not a passenger, the
claim is not included under the Warsaw Convention. Ar-
ticle 17 states, "The carrier shall be liable for damage sus-
tained in the event of the death or wounding of a
passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passen-
ger ...... The Convention provides no definition of pas-
senger, but Article 1 states the Convention applies to all
international air transportation of "persons, baggage or
goods." 9 A passenger must be a person and, under Ar-
ticle 1, the person is a passenger whether he paid for his
transportation or is transported gratuitously.' 20  Two
types of cases address the issue of whether the plaintiff is
a passenger: 1) employees on board for various purposes
and 2) persons not accepted as passengers who claim in-
jury as a result of not being on board.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re Mex-
ico City Air Crash 12 1 held that crew members such as flight
attendants working on board were not passengers under
the Warsaw Convention, but that a "deadheading" flight
attendant travelling home might be able to bring an ac-
tion under the Convention. 122 The court remanded the
case to district court for a fact determination of the exact
status of the flight attendant plaintiff when the accident
took place. 123
118 Barratt v. Trinidad & Tobago Airways, 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,393, 18,395
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1990).
19 Article 1(1) states in full: "This Convention shall apply to all international
transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire. It
shall apply equally to gratuitous transportation by aircraft performed by an air
transportation enterprise." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1 (1).
o20 Id. art. 17.
12, 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983).
122 Id. at 417-18.
123 Id.
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The Second Circuit in Sulewski v. Federal Express Corp. 124
similarly held that an aircraft mechanic killed when a
cargo carrier crashed was not a passenger.' 25 The court
affirmed the district court's granting of summary judg-
ment to the defendant airline, saying that Sulewski was
not issued a ticket and the Convention did not apply.' 26
Rejecting the idea that mere presence on board the air-
craft would satisfy the definition of passenger, the court
stressed that the Convention was intended to cover those
persons traveling under a contract for carriage. 27 Sulew-
ski's status as an employee was clear since he was not
commuting to or from his job and he was required to be
on board by virtue of his employment.' 28 Therefore, his
claim did not arise under the Warsaw Convention, but
arose exclusively under workers' compensation. 29
The second type of passenger case is illustrated by
Adamsons v. American Airlines. 130 In Adamsons a plaintiff who
had been refused passage on American Airlines sued for
resulting medical injuries. Adamsons was attempting to
leave Haiti to get medical care in New York City when
American refused to board her due to her condition.
Adamsons' condition worsened significantly during the
two-day wait for a Pan American flight off the island. De-
fendant American Airlines tried unsuccessfully to assert
the Convention liability limit as a defense against Adam-
sons' claim. The court held that since she was never ac-
cepted as a passenger, the Convention and its liability
limit did not apply.' 3 1 Adamsons was awarded ajudgment
1-4 933 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1991).
125 Id. at 185.
126 Id. at 183-84.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 186. Sulewski was on board the cargo flight in his employment capac-
ity as an aircraft mechanic to perform maintenance and repairs on the aircraft
which was flying into airports where the carrier did not employ mechanics. His
duties included supervising fueling and ground operations and conducting pre-
flight and post-flight inspections. Id. at 181.
129 Id.
130 433 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 449 N.Y.S.2d 487 (App. Div. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 457 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209 (1983).
-' Id. at 369-70.
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of $500,000 on her claim.' 32
American federal district courts are in conflict on
whether the Warsaw Convention applies to the airlines'
practice of "bumping" passengers (denying boarding to
passengers due to overbooking). 33  Since a claim for
damages for delay due to flight cancellation or "bump-
ing" can usually be sustained under a contract action, the
issue has not yet been resolved.
1. Embarkation and Disembarkation
Article 17 provides that the air carrier is liable for per-
sonal injuries or death that occur when the victim is a pas-
senger on board the aircraft or while embarking or
disembarking. '" Courts continue to try to define the pa-
rameters of "embarking or disembarking."
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Day v.
Trans World Airlines '35 adopted a test that has been used in
subsequent cases. The test considers "activity (what the
plaintiffs were doing), control (at whose direction), and
location."' 36  Thus, the analysis asks three questions: 1)
what was the passenger doing, 2) at whose direction was
the passenger acting, and 3) where was the passenger.
The passengers in Day were undergoing a baggage and
personal search prior to boarding the aircraft in Athens,
Greece, when terrorists attacked. Applying the three fac-
tor test, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding that the passengers were in the process of em-
barking and that the Convention applied. 3 7 The court as-
132 Id. at 370.
'-1 See Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 69, 73 (N.D. Il. 1985) (delay
due to overbooking of flight from India to New York comes under the Conven-
tion); Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines, 541 F. Supp. 1338, 1340 (W.D. Pa.
1982) (delay caused by flight cancellation does not come under the Convention);
Mahaney v. Air France, 474 F. Supp. 532, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (delay due to
overbooking would fall under the Convention, but was filed beyond the two year
statute of limitations established by the Convention).
-4 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.
1-5 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
136 Id. at 33.
157 Id. at 38.
[58
LIABILITY LIMITATIONS
serted its view of the benefits of the Convention, as
modified by the Montreal Agreement, pointing out that
the Convention allows passengers to avoid the burden of
suing an airport operator in a foreign country. Disadvan-
tages of that requirement would include expense, incon-
venience, pretrial investigation, travel, and undue delay of
payments urgently needed by the victim or his
survivors. 138
In a subsequent case centering on the issue of embarka-
tion, Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines,13 9 the Second Cir-
cuit, while applying the Day test, took care to distinguish
the facts in the two cases. 4 ° Buonocare was killed in a
terrorist attack in the Rome airport. Unlike the passen-
gers in Day, he had not gone through immigration, had
just checked in, was free to roam about the airport, was
nowhere near the gate, and had two hours before depar-
ture. In contrast, the passengers in Day were at the gate
preparing to board, in a restricted area, within minutes of
boarding. In affirming summary judgment for TWA, the
court refused to hold the airline liable for all accidents
that occur in public areas of airports. 14 1
Other courts generally agree that under the Warsaw
Convention accidents which occur in public areas of air-
port terminals are not the responsibility of the airlines. 142
Following the district court's reasoning in Day that a dis-
embarking passenger has fewer activities to perform than
138 Id. at 34.
19 900 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1990).
140 Id. at 10, 11.
141 Id. at 11.
142 See Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279, 282 (1st Cir. 1976) (passengers
have completed disembarking when they are waiting for luggage in terminal), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 950 (1977); Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines, 741 F. Supp.
441, 443-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (airline is not liable for injury received on walkway in
the airport during transfer to a connecting flight on the same airline); De la Cruz
v. Dominicana de Aviacion, 22 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,639, 17,643 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
1989) (injury received while collecting baggage in the terminal is not covered by
the Warsaw Convention); Upton v. Iran Nat'l Airlines, 450 F. Supp. 176, 178
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (passengers had not started embarking when roof collapsed on
them in main terminal after they had collected baggage), aft'd, 603 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1979).
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an embarking passenger, 43 courts have excluded post-
flight immigration and customs activities from the defini-
tion of disembarking, 144 as well as transportation within
the terminal. 45 Until the passenger reaches the terminal,
however, he is in the process of disembarking. Thus, a
passenger who fell on board a bus transporting passen-
gers from the aircraft to the terminal was within the
Convention. 46
To summarize, the control test in Day supplies a
broader application to embarking passengers than to dis-
embarking passengers. Embarking passengers may be
covered by Article 17 while still in the terminal if under
the control of the airline and close to departure. Dis-
embarking passengers are not covered under the Conven-
tion once they have reached the terminal.
2. On Board
To be a passenger, the victim must have been embark-
ing, disembarking, or "on board" when the incident oc-
curred. The phrase "on board" is easier to define than
embarking and disembarking and has stimulated less
litigation. The New York state trial court in Herman v.
Trans World Airlines held the air carrier liable under the
Warsaw Convention for passenger injuries suffered when
the aircraft was hijacked on a runway in Jordan. 47 Since
the passengers had not disembarked, they were "on
board." 148
In a broad interpretation of "on board," the district
court in Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport 49 held that injuries
claimed by hijacked passengers for the period on board
- 393 F. Supp. at 217, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aft'd, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
'4 Knoll v. Trans World Airlines, 610 F. Supp. 844, 847 (D. Colo. 1985).
- Curran v. Aer Lingus, 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,560, 17,562 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,
1982) (riding an escalator to customs is not disembarking).
146 Ricotta v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, 482 F. Supp. 497, 500 (E.D.N.Y.
1979).
147 330 N.Y.S.2d 829, 832-33 (1972).
148 Id. at 833.
149 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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the aircraft, as well as in a hotel in Jordan, were covered
by the Convention since the passengers had embarked in
Zurich, Switzerland, and had not yet disembarked at their
destination in New York.' 50
D. NOTICE
1. Delivery of a Ticket
Article 3(1) of the Warsaw Convention requires the car-
rier to deliver a ticket to the passenger containing the fol-
lowing information: date of issue; names of departure,
destination, and stopping places; name and address of
carrier(s); and a statement of the Convention liability lim-
its. '5 Article 3(2) further specifies that accepting a pas-
senger without having delivered a ticket will result in the
air carrier's loss of the liability limit protections. 5 2 For
years, a carrier's violation of Article 3 has been a major
means for the plaintiff to avoid damage limitations of the
Convention.
- Id. at 1247. The injuries suffered were strictly mental distress with no physi-
cal manifestations. The line of cases following Husserl has recently been overruled
by the United States Supreme Court in Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489
(1991), discussed infra at nn. 230-41 and accompanying text.
'51 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3(1). Article 3 of the Convention
states:
(1) For the transportation of passengers, the carrier must deliver a
passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may re-
serve the right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity and
that if he exercises that right, the alteration shall not have the effect
of depriving the transportation of its international character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relat-
ing to liability established by this Convention.
(2) The absence, irregularity or loss of the passenger ticket shall not
affect the existence or the validity of the contract of transportation,
which shall nonetheless be subject to the rules of this Convention.
Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger
ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself
of those provisions of this Convention which exclude or limit his
liability.
Id. art. 3.
152 Id. art. 3(2).
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Courts have routinely held that to satisfy Article 3 the
ticket must be delivered before the trip begins, so that the
passengers may take precautionary measures, as desired,
or at least be aware of the risk they are undertaking. The
Second Circuit in Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., held
that delivery of the ticket to passengers already on board
the aircraft was inadequate.' 54 The court stated the com-
mon sense proposition that, once on board, the passen-
gers could not exercise options such as deciding not to
go, entering a special contract with the airline, or taking
out extra insurance.'5 5 Similarly, in Warren v. Flying Tiger
Line, Inc. ,156 the Ninth Circuit held that delivery of a ticket
to passengers at the boarding ramp failed to satisfy Article
3.'57 In both Mertens and Warren, the Convention liability
limits did not apply to the awards for injuries and death
resulting from the crashes.
Delivery of a ticket for the second leg of a trip was held
to be inadequate delivery under the Convention in Manion
v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc. 158 The passenger was on a
trip from New York to Saudi Arabia, with the first stop in
Rome, where she was injured in a terrorist attack. Be-
cause the airline had accepted the passenger in New York
without a ticket, Article 3(2) had not been satisfied, even
though a ticket was delivered in Rome. 159 Therefore, the
liability limit did not apply. In Domangue v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc. the court held that presenting a ticket at the ticket
counter was an adequate delivery because the passenger
had time to take precautions, if desired.' 60 According to
the court, the passenger in Domangue had enough time be-
tween checking in and boarding the aircraft to decide
whether to buy extra insurance.' 6'
"'3 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
- Id. at 857.
155 Id. at 856-57.
156 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
157 Id. at 498.
158 434 N.E.2d 1060, 1061 (N.Y. 1982).
-5 Id. at 1061.
-6 531 F. Supp. 334, 340-41 (E.D. La. 1981).
161 Id. at 341.
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2. 1 O-Point Type Requirement
In 1966, the Montreal Agreement added a requirement
that the tickets for international flights give notice of the
liability limitations in type no smaller than 10-point.
62
The Agreement also specified the exact language to be
used in the notice on the tickets.' 63
Until the recent United States Supreme Court ruling in
Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd. ,'64 courts had consistently held
that notice in type smaller than 10-point was inadequate
and removed the liability limit. Tickets in 4-point type
clearly failed to provide adequate notice in Lisi v. Alitalia-
Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A. 165 The court held that the notice
was so small that it was "virtually invisible,"' 166 and there-
fore the court refused to enforce the liability limita-
tions.1 67 Notice in 4.5-type also barred the air carrier
from asserting the limitations in another case.' 6 8 In 1983
the Second Circuit held 8.5-point type was not adequate
notice in In re Air Crash at Warsaw, Poland.169 Even 9-point
type, in In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana,
was held insufficient to afford liability limitation protec-
tion from the Warsaw Convention/Montreal Agreement
scheme. 70
The United States Supreme Court ruling in Chan v. Ko-
rean Airlines,' 7' breaking with over twenty-five years of pre-
cedent, held that failure to provide 10-point type does not
162 Montreal Agreement, supra note 5, at 305.
163 See Montreal Agreement, Advice to International Passengers on Limitation
of Liability, supra note 62. The Civil Aeronautics Board had also adopted 10-point
type as a minimum standard for Warsaw Convention liability limitations notice in
1963, and further specified contrasting ink as a requirement. Department of
Transportation Economic Regulation, 14 C.F.R. § 221.175 (1992).
1- 485 U.S. 986 (1988).
165 370 F.2d 508, 513-14 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
166 Id. at 514.
167 Id.
16 Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 234 N.E.2d 199, 202-03 (N.Y. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968).
169 705 F.2d 85, 89-90, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983).
170 789 F.2d 1092, 1098 (5th Cir.), vacated, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989).
17, 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
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defeat liability limitations. 172 Justice Scalia, writing the
majority opinion, stated that although Korean Airline's
tickets provided only 8-point notice, that irregularity did
not trigger the sanction in Article 3(2) of unlimited liabil-
ity.' 73 Justice Scalia stated that a ticket was delivered, and
thus the liability limits were not forfeited.174 The Court's
rigid reading of Article 3 seems to say that airlines need
not give notice of the personal injury damage limitation in
order to protect themselves with that limitation. Justice
Brennan, in his concurring opinion, agreed that 8-point
type in this case was adequate notice, but expressed a con-
cern that some minimum standard must apply.' 75 The
ruling of the Supreme Court signals that a stricter reading
of the Warsaw Convention is in order and lower courts
may not so readily circumvent the liability limitation in the
future.
E. WILLFUL MISCONDUCT
The most direct way to avoid the liability limit under
the Warsaw Convention is to prove willful misconduct by
the carrier under Article 25.176 Article 25 expressly states
that the carrier cannot use the Convention to exclude or
limit liability if willful misconduct caused the injury. The
Montreal Agreement of 1966 does not affect the willful
misconduct exception.177
Added to the Convention's failure to define "willful
misconduct" is the fact that the original French text used
the word "dol," which has no real English translation.
7
172 Id. at 124.
'73 Id. at 127.
174 Id. at 128.
'75 Id. at 150 (Brennan, J., concurring).
176 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 25.
177 U.S. Dept. of State Memorandum, U.S. Government Action Concerning the
Warsaw Convention 4 (1966). The statement by the State Department expressly
provides, "should the claimant succeed in proving willful misconduct, he would
be subject to limitation on his recovery." Id.
178 In French, Article 25(1) says:
La transporteur n'aura pas le droit do se prvaloir des dispositions
de la pr~sente Convention qui excluent ou limitent sa responsabilit6,
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The closest concept to dol in common law jurisdictions is
willful misconduct. Making the test even more ambigu-
ous, the provision in Article 25(1) states that willful mis-
conduct may be defined by the court applying its own
law.' 79 Thus, courts across the United States have used
varied definitions and arrived at varied results in cases
where the plaintiff sought to prove willful misconduct by
the carrier.
A panel of judges in Koninklike Luchtvaart Maatschappi
N. V v. Tuller 180 approved of the charge to the jury which
defined willful misconduct as "the intentional perform-
ance of an act with knowledge that the.., act will proba-
bly result in injury or damage, or ... in some manner as
to imply reckless disregard of the consequences of its per-
formance."'' 81 The court added that the conduct may be
an omission as well as an act.' 8 2
The jury in Tuller found the carrier guilty of willful mis-
conduct, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that the
crew's acts constituted a willful omission of a positive
duty, providing adequate evidence for a jury finding.18 3
Among the airline's wrongful acts were failing to establish
crew procedures to inform passengers about the location
and use of life vests, failing to send distress messages in
violation of the airline's own regulations, and failing to
effectively use the life rafts.18 4
Courts defining willful misconduct have stressed that an
intention to do harm is not required for a finding of will-
ful misconduct. In Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air,
Inc. ,185 where a crash resulted from erroneously switching
hose lines for altimeters, the jury charge, approved by the
si le dommage provient de son dol or d'une faute qui, d'apr~s la loi
du tribunal saisi, est consideree comme equivalente au dol.
GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 11, at 193.
'19 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 25(1).
'80 292 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
18, Id. at 778.
182 Id.
18s Id. at 779.
184 Id. at 779-80.
185 187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951).
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Second Circuit, stated willful misconduct "does not mean
that the defendant, or any of its employees, had a deliber-
ate intention to kill [the passenger] or to wreck this air-
plane."'18 6 The only requirement is the intentional
performance of an act either "with knowledge that the...
act will probably result in injury or damage[s]" or "in
such a manner as to imply reckless disregard of the prob-
able consequences .... "187
Similarly, a jury charge in Berner v. British Commonwealth
Pac. Airlines, Ltd. 188 specifically eliminated deliberate in-
tention to do harm as the test for willful misconduct. 8 9 In
Berner a fatal crash resulted when the pilot descended
even though he was told to maintain altitude. The jury
found for the defendant, but the judge granted the plain-
tiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.' 9°
The Second Circuit, however, reinstated the jury ver-
dict. 9 ' The jury instructions defined willful misconduct
as a deliberate act performed with reckless disregard of
the probable consequences.19 2
Willful misconduct, then, is an issue of fact, depending
on the circumstances of the case. Usually the claim in-
volves the flight crew. In Butler v. Aeromexico 193 the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed ajury finding
of willful misconduct by the crew when it turned off the
radar while flying in bad weather and a crash occurred. 94
The D.C. Circuit affirmed a jury verdict in In re Korean
Air Lines Disaster 195 which also found willful misconduct by
the flight crew. Even though the court acknowledged that
186 Id. at 124.
187 Id.
188 219 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
189 Id. at 360.
-9 Id. at 326.
191 Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 541-42
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
192 Id.
193 774 F.2d 429 (11 th Cir. 1985).
194 Id. at 431-32.
195 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 616 (1991).
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evidence was "sparse,"' 196 consisting of radar data, the re-
port of the Secretary of the ICAO, and expert testimony
based on the ICAO report, the court did not disturb the
jury verdict of willful misconduct, although it did reverse
the award of punitive damages.
197
The limited evidence available in this case demonstrates
the need for an objective rather than a subjective test to
prove willful misconduct. Since airline crashes often leave
no hard evidence as to what actually happened, the plain-
tiff can only show that the pilot should have known the
probable consequences of his act rather than what the pi-
lot actually knew. The objective test is usually applied in
the United States, since a subjective test, requiring proof
of the wrongdoer's actual state of mind, is difficult to
prove unless circumstantial evidence is permitted.' 98
Two Lockerbie damage suits have succeeded in finding
Pan Am guilty of willful misconduct at the trial court
level. 199 The first jury awarded the relatives of one victim
of the Lockerbie crash $9.2 million, and the next week the
widow of another victim received $9 million. Pan Am is
now bankrupt, but its insurer plans to appeal. ° ° With
more than 200 plaintiffs who won the liability portion of
the suit against Pan Am potentially able to claim huge
damages, the appeals process will be the focus of great
attention by airlines, insurers, legislators, and litigators.
The Second Circuit in Ospina v. Trans World Airlines20
1
reversed the trial court's finding of willful misconduct in
the 1986 bomb explosion on a TWA flight landing in Ath-
ens, Greece. 0 According to the test applied in Ospina, to
prove willful misconduct the plaintiff must show the air-
line "omitted to do an act (1) with knowledge that the
1- Id. at 1479.
197 Id. at 1490.
198 GOLDHIRSCH, supra note 11, at 121-22.
- Second Lockerbie Damage Award a Near-Record $9 Million, THE REUTER LIBR.
REP., July 29, 1992.
200 Id.
201 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992).
202 Id. at 37.
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omission of that act probably would result in damage or
injury, or (2) in a manner that implied a reckless disre-
gard of the probable consequences. ' 20 3 Because TWA
complied with FAA procedures and the national laws in
countries where it operated, the court held that TWA's
failure to search the cabin and cockpit for bombs did not
constitute willful misconduct.20 4 Conceding that such a
search would have revealed the bomb, the court neverthe-
lesss concluded that "the test for willful misconduct is not
20-20 hindsight. 2 0 5
The dissent brought out the additional fact that even
though TWA personnel in Cairo had identified the pas-
senger who carried the bomb as a "profile selectee," air-
line employees failed to conduct a redundant screening, a
procedure TWA and the United States government had
agreed upon for Egyptian operations. 6 The majority,
evidently, did not view the failure of TWA to screen bags
of the suspect passenger as willful misconduct since that
practice was not a formal regulation. TWA's compliance
with FAA regulations and local laws gave it Warsaw liabil-
ity protection.
Whether a court may tell the jury that without a finding
of willful misconduct the plaintiff will be limited to a
$75,000 recovery is an unsettled question. In In reAircrash
in Bali, Indonesia20 7 the judge informed the jury of the
Warsaw Convention liability limit and the requirement of
a finding of willful misconduct in order to avoid the limi-
tation. The Ninth Circuit held that the judge did not
abuse his discretion since an issue in the case was whether
adequate notice of the limitation was given.2' Thus, the
information was necessary to the jury decision on other
issues. The Second Circuit also has held that the jury may




206 Id. at 38-39 (Nickerson, J., dissenting).
207 871 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1989).
200 Id. at 814.
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interrogatories .209
Two circuits reached contrary results in two other
cases. In Gullett v. Saint Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Co. 210 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted
the potential prejudicial effect of such information given
to the jury,2 ' and in Carvahlo v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc. 21 2 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial judge's refusal
to tell the jury of the legal effects of its responses to spe-
cial interrogatories.1 3
In sum, due to the little evidence remaining after most-
airline accidents, the difficult task of proving willful mis-
conduct becomes even harder, even with the use of an ob-
jective test and circumstancial evidence. Perhaps a system
offering absolute liability, requiring no proof of wrongdo-
ing, together with a greatly increased liability limit is the
solution. Proponents of Montreal Protocol 3 and the




Besides strictly applying the liability cap of $75,000 set
by the Warsaw Convention, courts have limited the types
of damages that may be collected under the Convention,
in spite of the fact that the Convention itself does not so
limit them.
1. Punitive Damages
Neither the Warsaw Convention nor the Montreal
Agreement specifies the types of damages a plaintiff may
recover for personal injury or death. Article 24(2) of the
Convention states which persons are entitled to sue under
the Convention and that their rights are determined by
2- Vinieris v. Byzantine Maritime Corp., 731 F.2d 1061, 1065 (2d Cir. 1984).
210 446 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1971).
211 Id. at 1105.
212 794 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1986).
213 Id. at 456-57.
214 See discussion infra part IV.B.
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local law. 5
The Second Circuit recently resolved a conflict in dis-
trict court holdings as to whether punitive damages may
be recovered under the Warsaw Convention. In In re Hi-
jacking of Pan American World Airways Inc. Aircraft at Karachi
Int'lAirport, Pakistan 216 the United States District Court in
the Southern District of New York held that the Conven-
tion does not preempt recovery of punitive damages 72 17
while that same year the court in the Eastern District of
New York held in In re Air Disaster in Lockerbie, Scotland2 18
that the Convention rejects recovery of punitive dam-
ages.2 9  The Second Circuit reversed Karachi and af-
firmed Lockerbie, and the United States Supreme Court
refused to hear the appeal.22 °
The Second Circuit reasoned that the proper transla-
tion of the French phrase dommage survena in Article 17221
is "damages sustained," and refers only to monetary or
compensatory damages, not punitive.22 Responding to
the plaintiffs' argument that Article 24(2), by leaving the
measure of damages to local law, permits punitive dam-
ages, the court held that the article applied only to calcu-
215 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 24. Article 24 of the Convention
states:
(1) In the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 any action for dam-
ages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the condi-
tions and limits set out in this Convention.
(2) In the cases covered by Article 17 the provisions of the preced-
ing paragraph shall also apply, without prejudice to the questions as
to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are
their respective rights.
Id.
216 729 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
217 Id. at 19.
218 733 F. Supp. 547 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
219 Id. at 549.
2 2 In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267, 1288 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
22, The official version of the Warsaw Convention is written in French, which
has created difficulties for United States courts attempting to interpret the strict
language of the treaty.
222 928 F.2d at 1281.
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lating compensatory damages, not to recovery of punitive
damages.22 3 The court based its holding primarily on the
drafting history of the Convention, and the drafters' pur-
pose of the Convention to limit liability of international
air carriers. 22 14 The court concluded its decision with
three policy considerations that punitive damages would
destroy uniformity, defeat the goal of making airlines in-
surable, and increase litigation.22 5
The federal court in the Southern District of New York
has already followed the Lockerbie precedent in Priestly v.
American Airlines, Inc.226 The plaintiff, whose broken leg
was refractured when airline employees dropped him
while carrying him to the aircraft at the Bermuda airport,
alleged willful conduct and demanded punitive damages.
The court refused to allow the plaintiff to amend his com-
plaint to add a plea for punitive damages, stating "the de-
mand for punitive damages is clearly futile in light of
existing case law." 227
2. Prejudgment Interest
The issue of whether prejudgment interest may be
awarded in addition to the Warsaw limitation for death is
unsettled. Two prominent decisions, Domangue v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc. 228 and O'Rourke v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. ,2219 pres-
ent directly contrary holdings. In Domangue, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held prejudgment interest may increase the award
because interest is to compensate for slow payment, not
for injuries. 230 The court also expressed concern over
"the inequity of Eastern Airlines benefiting from the
length of time between the crash and a final judgment in
223 Id. at 1282-85.
224 Id. at 1284.
225 Id. at 1287-88.
226 No. 89 Civ. 8265 UMC), 1991 WL 64459 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1991).
227 Id. at *2.
228 722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1984).
229 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984).
2-o 722 F.2d at 263.
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this case to the detriment of decedent's survivors." '2 31
However, in O'Rourke, the Second Circuit held prejudg-
ment interest was not recoverable in a wrongful death ac-
tion under the Convention since a fundamental principle
of the Convention was to limit liability to a fixed sum. 232
The issue is not resolved.
3. Emotional Distress
Article 17 applies to "the death or wounding of a pas-
senger or any other bodily injury. "233 Prior to Eastern Air-
lines, Inc. v. Floyd,234 two lines of cases presented contrary
views as to whether the Convention covers mental
anguish or emotional distress, absent physical injury.
One line of cases follows Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport
Corp.,23 5 which held mental injuries are within the Con-
vention's coverage.236 The Eleventh Circuit in Floyd v.
Eastern Airlines237 reached the same conclusion by an anal-
ysis of the French term "lesion corporelle," translated
into English as "bodily injury," coupled with a broad in-
terpretation of the treaty and its goals. 238 The Eleventh
Circuit took issue with the decision in Rosman v. Trans
World Airlines, which had analyzed the phrase "bodily in-
jury" and concluded mental injury alone was not compen-
sable under the treaty. 239
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
Floyd to resolve the conflict in holdings. 240 The case arose
from a flight from Miami to the Bahamas, during which all
three engines failed. The plane plunged and passengers
were told to prepare to ditch in the Atlantic before the
crew was able to make a safe trip back to Miami by re-
231 Id. at 263-64.
232 730 F.2d at 852.
231 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.
234 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
235 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
236 Id. at 1250.
237 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
2- Id. at 1471-73.
239 314 N.E.2d 848, 852-57 (N.Y. 1974).
240 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
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starting an engine. Several passengers filed separate com-
plaints alleging emotional distress. The Court
determined that the correct translation for the French "le-
sion corporelle" is "bodily injury," and thus "Article 17
does not permit recovery for purely psychic injuries."' 24 1
Therefore, no cause of action lies under the Convention
for emotional injury unaccompanied by physical injury.
The Court also considered the treaty's history, purposes,
and the intent of the signatories in arriving at its decision,
emphasizing the purpose of international uniformity in
the initial enactment of the Convention. 42
G. SUMMARY
By narrowly defining terms and adhering closely to the
original purposes of the Warsaw Convention, American
courts today generally are holding firm to the $75,000
personal injury and death liability limitation presently ap-
plied to international air travel accidents. 43 The Con-
vention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement, shows
no signs of being diminished by present-day court
decisions.
If plaintiffs are ever to collect more than the present
$75,000 for personal injury or death, legislative action
must be taken.244
241 Id. at 1494.
242 Id. at 1502. The Court pointed out the high degree of proof required for
recovery of mental distress in many countries. For example, American courts re-
quire a showing of extreme and outrageous conduct by the tortfeasor, British
courts limit recovery by use of foreseeability requirements, and French courts re-
quire proof of fault and direct and certain damages. Because the Convention, as
modified by the Montreal Agreement, confers absolute liability on the carriers,
the Court chose not to subject international air carriers to "strict liability for
purely mental distress." Id.
243 Contrast this tightening of the liability limitation in the United States with
the recent decision of the ten airlines in Japan to waive liability limitations entirely
for disasters on international passenger flights. The decision of the Japanese air-
lines should add pressure to the American industry to take similar action. Yumiko
Ono & Bridget O'Brian, Japan's Airlines Waive Limits for Accidents, WALL ST. J., Nov.
23, 1992, at A11.
244 In his speech entitled, "How Much is the Plaintiff at Sea with Warsaw?"
given at the February, 1992 SMU Air Law Symposium, Gerald C. Stems, after
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IV. MONTREAL PROTOCOL 3
A. BACKGROUND AND PROVISIONS
Montreal Protocol 3 is a proposed amendment to the
Warsaw Convention that has been in limbo since the draft
was prepared at a diplomatic conference held in Montreal
in 1975.245 Every United States president has supported
the Protocol since it was first transmitted to the Senate in
1977.46 Following the defeat of the Protocol in the Sen-
ate in 1983, the Reagan administration revised the
Supplemental Compensation Plan, and the Bush adminis-
tration has called for Senate approval since 1989.247 The
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported favora-
bly on the Protocol most recently on January 29, 1991,
but the Senate as a whole has not yet considered whether
to give its advice and consent to ratification. 48
Article I of Montreal Protocol 3, together with Article
XVII, states that Protocol 3 modifies the Warsaw Conven-
summarizing recent court holdings strictly upholding Warsaw liability limits, chal-
lenged the legislature to act.
The system is skewed, and indefensibly so, in two directions: first as
against the innocent passenger in the carrier accident-only case, and
secondly in the involvement of the airframe, engine, component and
air traffic control people in practically every case (the Warsaw Con-
vention protects only airlines). Much of the creative product liability
law in aviation matters has come about because of the Warsaw/Mon-
treal aberration. So long as million dollar losses are going to be
paid $75,000 by the airlines' insurers, the insurers of other aviation
defendants, as well as the companies themselves, are going to take it
on the chin.
The ball is firmly in the legislature's court. However, each deci-
sion in which a court is forced to uphold the now-ridiculous goal of
nurturing the "fledgling" aviation industry highlights the need for
change. These recent decisions should focus attention on long-
awaited reforms.
Gerald C. Stems, Address at the 26th Annual SMUAir Law Symposium 19-20 (Feb.
1992) (on file with the Journal of Air Law and Commerce). Stems, however, did not
address the form those "long-awaited reforms" should take.
245 S. EXEC. REP. No. 1, supra note 83, at 4.
246 Id. at 13.
247 Id.
248 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had reported the Protocol favora-
bly on June 21, 1990, as well, but the 101st Congress did not consider it before
adjournment. Montreal Protocol 3 and the Supplemental Compensation Plan, supra note
8, at 5.
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tion, as amended by both the Hague Protocol and the
Guatemala City Protocol, 249 and indicates that all three
should be read together as one document. 50
Article II of the Protocol changes the requirement of
ticket delivery. Failure to deliver a ticket will not result in
lifting the liability limitations. Itinerary information can
be preserved by "any other means" as a substitute for de-
livery of a ticket.25 1 The purpose of this article is to en-
able airlines to use automated ticketing procedures. 52
How the passenger will be informed of the liability limita-
tion is unclear.
Article IV of Montreal Protocol 3253 makes several
changes in the language of Article 17 in the Warsaw Con-
vention. Written in English, rather than French, the
phrase "personal injury" replaces the term "bodily in-
jury. ' 254 A more important change is the replacement of
the term "accident" with "the event which caused the
death or injury. "255 Hijackings and bombings can clearly
fit into the new language, removing any doubt whether
such acts are "accidents." Article IV adds one qualifica-
tion to carrier liability which Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention did not expressly layout but which has been
established by judicial decisions defining "accident." The
249 S. EXEC. REP. No. 1, supra note 83, at 13.
25 Article XVII of Montreal Protocol 3 expressly provides: "As between the
Parties to this Protocol, the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague in
1955 and this Protocol shall be read and interpreted together as one single instru-
ment and shall be known as the Warsaw Convention as amended at The Hague and at
Guatemala City, 1971." LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW, vol. 1,
§ 12B.03(l).
251 S. EXEC. REP. No. 1, supra note 83, at 28.
252 Id. at 42.
253 Article IV of Montreal Protocol 3 states:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or per-
sonal injury of a passenger upon condition only that the event which
caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
However, the carrier is not liable if the death or injury resulted
solely from the state of health of the passenger.
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qualification is that the carrier is not responsible for inju-
ries resulting "solely from the state of health of the pas-
senger. ' 256  Thus, Article IV's new language clarifies
issues which have generated case law and also expressly
expands the carrier's liability.
Article V1257 further increases the carrier's liability by
deleting Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention,258 which
had provided a defense for the carrier if it showed that it
had taken all "necessary measures to avoid the damage or
that it was impossible for him or them to take such meas-
ures."259 Montreal Protocol 3 limits that defense to liabil-
ity for injury to passengers caused by delay only and
retains the defense for damage to cargo caused by de-
struction, loss, damage, or delay. Article VI tightens even
further the carrier's absolute liability for personal injury
or death.
Article V11260 of the Protocol retains one exception to
256 Id.
257 Article VI of Montreal Protocol 3 provides:
Article 20 of the Convention shall be deleted and replaced by the
following: Article 20
1. In the carriage of passengers and baggage the carrier shall not
be liable for damage occasioned by delay if he proves that he and his
servants and agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage or that it [was] [i]mpossible for them to take such measures.
2. In the carriage of cargo the carrier shall not be liable for dam-
age resulting from destruction, loss, damage or delay if he proves
that he and his servants and agents have taken all necessary meas-
ures to avoid the damage or that it [was] [im]possible for them to
take such measures.
KREINDLER, supra note 249, § 12B.03(3).
258 Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention provided a broader defense for the
carriers and stated: "The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his
agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was im-
possible for him or them to take such measures." Warsaw Convention, supra note
1, art. 20(1).
259 Id.
26- Article VII of Montreal Protocol 3 provides new language for Article 21 of
the Warsaw Convention as follows:
If the carrier proves that the damage was caused or contributed to by
the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the person
claiming compensation, the carrier shall be wholly or partly exoner-
ated from his liability to such person to the extent that such negli-
gence or wrongful act or omission caused or contributed to the
damage. When by reason of the death or injury of a passenger com-
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absolute liability by expanding and particularizing the
contributory negligence provision of Article 21 of the
Warsaw Convention. 261 Because the Protocol includes a
mandatory supplemental insurance plan added to the
ticket cost, tracing a saboteur through insurance purchase
for a particular flight will no longer be possible. If the
carrier can prove the identity of the saboteur, however,
revised Article 21 specifically excludes liability to him or
his beneficiaries. Note also that by eliminating the lan-
guage "in accordance with the provisions of its own law"
in Article 21 of the Convention, but keeping the language
"wholly or partly exonerated," revised Article 21 estab-
lishes the rule of comparative negligence, rather than con-
tributory negligence, regardless of the forum.
Article VIII of the Guatemala Protocol substitutes Spe-
cial Drawing Rights (SDR) of the International Monetary
Fund for the gold franc. 6 2 The liability limit for all claims
for personal injury or death is 100,000 SDRs. 261 A settle-
ment inducement clause empowers courts to award attor-
neys' fees and court costs to plaintiffs if the carrier fails to
offer to settle within six months of receiving the claim.264
Articles IX and X of Montreal Protocol 3 make a signifi-
cant change in the Warsaw Convention scheme as
amended by the Montreal Agreement by removing the
possibility that a plaintiff can exceed the liability limit for
pensation is claimed by a person other than the passenger, the car-
rier shall likewise be wholly or partly exonerated from his liability to
the extent that he proves that the damage was caused or contributed
to by the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of that
passenger.
KREINDLER, supra note 249, § 12B.03(3).
261 Article 21 of the Warsaw Convention had simply stated, "If the carrier
proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the
injured person the court may, in accordance with the provisions of its own law,
exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his liability." Warsaw Convention,
supra note 1, art. 21.
262 S. EXEC. REP. No. 1, supra note 83, at 15.
263 Id. As of May 14, 1991, 100,000 SDRs would equal approximately
$143,000. Senators Predicting to Vote Soon on Montreal Protocols, AVIATION DAILY, May
14, 1991, at 300.
26 S. EXEC. REP. No. 1, supra note 83, at 16.
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personal injury or death by showing gross negligence or
willful misconduct by the carrier.265 Article 25 of the Con-
vention, which allowed plaintiffs to exceed the liability
limit if willful misconduct were proven, now only pertains
to cargo. An example clarifies the distinction. An airline
crash caused by an intentional act of an employee will per-
mit unlimited recovery for damage to or loss of cargo, but
will not affect the liability limit for personal injury or
death.266 Note further that the language in the new Arti-
cle 25 extends the liability limit to "servants or agents" of
the carrier, clarifying a previous open question as to the
extent of their protection.26 7
265 Article X of Montreal Protocol 3 provides:
Article 25 of the Convention shall be deleted and replaced by the
following:
Article 25
The limit of liability specified in paragraph 2 of Article 22 shall not
apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission
of the carrier, his servants, or agents, done with intent to cause dam-
age or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably
result; provided that, in the case of such act or omission of a servant
or agent, it is also proved that he was acting within the scope of his
employment.
KREINDLER, supra note 249, § 12B.03(4). Note the referenced paragraph 2 of Arti-
cle 22 refers to the Guatemala Protocol section which permits unlimited recovery
for cargo damage in the event of willful misconduct by the carrier. Paragraph 1 of
Article 22, which refers to personal injury or death caused by willful misconduct,
is eliminated.
266 Id.
267 In his speech entitled "Lessons of Lockerbie," Lee S. Kreindler discussed
the issue of liability limit for agents, a crucial issue in the Pan Am disaster of 1988.
Lee S. Kreindler, Address at the 25th Annual SMU Air Law Symposium (Feb. 1991)
(on file with the Journal of Air Law and Commerce). Pan Am delegated security
screening of passengers and baggage to a company called Alert Management Sys-
tems, a subsidiary of Pan Am. The bomb that destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland had successfully gone through baggage screening. Previous
cases, led by Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
922 (1977), held that the liability limit under the Warsaw Convention extended to
servants and agents of the airline. The language of the convention, however, does
not expressly cover agents and servants. Since the United States Supreme Court
in Chan v. Korean Airlines, 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989), held that courts must be
governed strictly by the text of the Convention, Kreindler hoped to see Reed over-
ruled. The U.S. district court in New York, however, ruled on October 1991 that
the agents that provided security services were protected by liability limitations of
Warsaw because the responsibility to provide safety measures to passengers was
Pan Am's. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 776 F. Supp. 710, 714
(E.D.N.Y. 1991). Therefore, the court dismissed all state claims brought against
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Article X11 268 expands the venue where an action may
be brought, greatly increasing the possibility that a United
States citizen may sue in a United States court for an in-
ternational airline accident. Article 28 of the Warsaw
Convention 269 provided the following venue options to a
plaintiff: the country of the carrier's domicile or principal
place of business, the country where the ticket was
bought, or the country of the final destination. 270 By in-
serting a new paragraph (2) into Article 28, the Protocol
adds the domicile or permanent residence of the passen-
ger as a venue, as long as the airline has an establishment
there. Accordingly, even if a United States citizen bought
a ticket in a foreign country to a foreign destination, he
might be able to bring an action in a United States court
under the Protocol, whereas he could not have done so
under the Convention.
Article XIV expressly recognizes the right of a signatory
Alert. Note that the new language of Montreal Protocol 3 reaches the same result
without the need for litigation.
2 6 Article XII adds the following language to Article 28 of the Warsaw
Convention:
In Article 28 of the Convention-the present paragraph 2 shall be
renumbered as paragraph 3 and a new paragraph 2 shall be inserted
as follows:
2. In respect of damage resulting from the death, injury or delay of
a passenger or the destruction, loss, damage or delay of baggage,
the action may be brought before one of the Courts mentioned in
paragraph 1 of this Article, or in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, before the Court within the jurisdiction of
which the carrier has an establishment if the passenger has his domi-
cile or permanent residence in the territory of the same High Con-
tracting Party.
KREINDLER, supra note 249, § 12B.03(8).
2-69 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28. Article 28 of the Convention
provides:
(1) An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his princi-
pal place of business, or where he has a place of business through
which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of
destination.
(2) Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the
court to which the case is submitted.
Id.
270 Id.
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nation to add a supplemental compensation plan to the
treaty.2 7' The Supplemental Compensation Plan, as pres-
ently proposed, defines "covered damages" as "all com-
pensatory damages supplementary to the compensation
payable by the carrier under the Convention in respect of
death or personal injury, including damages for economic
loss and non-economic loss. ' ' 272 Section 2.1 of the plan
permits up to $500,000,000 coverage in the aggregate per
incident, per aircraft. 73 Section 2.4 expressly excludes li-
ability for punitive damages. 274 A surcharge paid by the
passenger will fund the Supplemental Compensation Plan
under Section 3.1, which requires collection by the carrier
of a fee from every passenger departing from the United
States.275 Proponents currently predict that the surcharge
will be between $2 and $3 per ticket,2 76 but other esti-
mates range as high as $5 per ticket, a concern to oppo-
nents of the Protocol.
B. SUPPORT FOR PROTOCOL 3
Senator Nancy Kassebaum, in a prepared statement in-
serted into the record of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing on June 28, 1990,277 gave several rea-
sons for her strong support for Montreal Protocol 3. Ex-
pressing puzzlement about the strong opposition to
ratification of the Protocol, especially by the trial lawyers,
Senator Kassebaum enumerated the advantages of the
plan to victims of international airline accidents. First, the
Supplemental Compensation Plan will cover non-eco-
nomic damages as well as economic damages. 278 Com-
pensation should be quicker, since plaintiffs will no longer
271 S. EXEC. REP. No. 1, supra note 83, at 17.
272 Id. at 57.
273 Id. at 58.
274 Id. at 59.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 8.
277 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MONTREAL AVIATION PROTOCOLS 3
AND 4: REPORT TOGETHER WITH MINORITY VIEWS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 21, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1990).
278 Id. at 58.
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strive to prove willful misconduct.279 Senator Kassebaum
refutes those who argue that litigating fault results in
greater airline safety, pointing out that no statistics have
proven a relationship between the two.280 Finally, Kas-
sebaum notes that the Protocol has been languishing in
the Senate for approximately ten years without action and
calls for its ratification.2 8 '
Kenneth M. Mead, Director, Transportation Issues, Re-
sources, Community, and Economic Development Divi-
sion, General Accounting Office, testifying before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 28, 1990,
also stressed the advantages of the proposed new system
of compensation.282 Mead testified that the plan will
speed awards to the victims and bring awards for interna-
tional aviation accidents more in line with the awards for
domestic aviation accidents.283 On the issue of eliminat-
ing the willful misconduct provision, Mead reported that
U.S. courts have found willful misconduct by an air carrier
in only nine cases since the Convention went into effect
and that one case took fifteen years to litigate. 8 4
Regarding inadequacy of the proposed compensation
under Protocol 3, Mead pointed out that the largest pay-
out on record for a single airline disaster was $400 million
in Japan, and that $500 million in the Supplementary
Compensation Plan is in addition to the 100,000 SDRs
per passenger.28 5 Provisions for absolute liability of the
carrier and settlement inducement provisions are two
other improvements in the plan, according to Mead.28 6
Finally, responding to criticisms that removing fault pro-
visions would also remove incentives for airlines to oper-
279 Id. Senator Kassebaum points out that victims of Korean Air Lines flight
007 are still awaiting compensation, more than six years after the accident. Id. at
56.
280 Id. at 56.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 56.87.
283 Id. at 57.
284 Id. at 58.
285 Id. at 60.
286 Id.
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ate safely, Mead presented the view that "[m]arket forces
and Government regulatory oversight are the most im-
portant determinants of airline safety. "287
Department of Transportation Secretary Samuel Skin-
ner has encouraged the Senate to give its advice and con-
sent to the Protocol since 1989,28 and continued to urge
approval in 1991.289 His arguments in support of the pro-
tocol parallel those of Mead. Other supporters for
prompt ratification of the Protocol include the American
Bar Association, 290 the Air Transport Association, 29' and
the World Travel and Tourism Council.292
C. OPPOSITION TO PROTOCOL 3
Lee S. Kreindler, prominent plaintiffs' attorney, blasts
the Warsaw Convention and Montreal Protocol 3 regu-
larly in his column "Aviation Law" in the New York Law
journal and in other publications.2 9 3 Kreindler's premise
is that "[t]he American airline passenger . . . would be
better off with no international treaty at all."' 294 In the
event of failing to achieve denunciation of the Warsaw
Convention, Kreindler believes the American passenger
fares better under the present Warsaw Convention, as
amended by the Montreal Agreement, than he would
under Montreal Protocol 3 because under the Protocol
the limits would be entirely unbreakable. 95
287 Id. at 61.
288 DOT Secretary Recommends Ratification of Montreal Protocols, 297 AVIATION DAILY
320 (Aug. 17, 1989).
289 S. EXEC. REP. No. 1, supra note 83, at 55. (Letter from Skinner to Chairman
Pell, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations).
29 Id. at 74-75. (Letter from Robert D. Evans of the ABA to Chairman Pell).
291 Senators Predicting to Vote Soon on Montreal Protocols, 304 AVIATION DAILY 300,
(May 14, 1991).
292 Id.
29 See Lee S. Kreindler, Montreal and a Denunciation of Warsaw, N.Y.L.J., July 2,
1990, at 1; Lee S. Kreindler, The Montreal Protocols in a New Form, N.Y.LJ., June 4,
1990, at 3; Lee S. Kreindler, International Commentary: The Case Against the Warsaw
Convention, LLOYD'S AVIATION L., Mar. 15, 1989, at 1; Lee S. Kreindler, Warsaw
Convention: An Anachronism, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 30, 1988, at 3.
294 KREINDLER, supra note 249, § 12B.04(1).
295 Id. § 12B.04(2).
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Kreindler further believes that the settlement induce-
ment clauses and the imposition of absolute liability will
not speed up recoveries because plaintiffs' attorneys (like
himself) will continue to try to circumvent the limita-
tions. 96 Kreindler anticipates more lawsuits against the
aircraft manufacturer and the U.S. Government for negli-
gence by air traffic controllers.29 7 Finally, Kreindler ob-
jects to the mandated surcharge paid by the passenger for
limited benefits. 98 In sum, Kreindler advocates applying
the American tort system to recover damages for victims
of international air accidents. 99
Senators Joseph Biden and Paul Simon, members of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, express strong
objections to Montreal Protocol 3. ° ° Like Kreindler, they
not only want to defeat the Protocol but also want to de-
nounce the Warsaw Convention entirely. In a minority
statement inserted into the record of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Report on Montreal Protocols 3 and
4, Biden and Simon agreed that proving willful miscon-
duct is difficult and time-consuming, but they pointed out
that without the Warsaw Convention plaintiffs would have
to prove only negligence under standard tort theory.3 0 '
They argue that if the Senate will reject the Protocol, the
United States will be forced to denounce the Conven-
tion. °2 In summary, their statement expresses a fear that
adoption of Montreal Protocol 3 will end any chance of
denouncing the Warsaw Convention, their ultimate
goal. 30 3
Senator Biden elaborated on his position in a Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Hearing held on June 19,
2- Id. § 12B.04(3).
-7 Id. § 12B.04(4).
-8 Id. § 12B.04(5).
Id. § 12B.04(1).




20s S. EXEC. REP. No. 21, supra note 276, at 55.
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1990. Biden stated his opposition to protecting airlines
with limited liability and said that increasing the liability
limit to $130,000 "merely tinkers with an outdated sys-
tem. '3 0 4 Furthermore, in his view, eliminating the willful
misconduct exception makes the $130,000 limit literally
unbreakable and would remove safety incentives for air-
lines.30 5 Finally, making the surcharge for the supplemen-
tary compensation mandatory requires the passenger to
fund his own insurance and provides him with only lim-
306ited coverage.
V. CONCLUSION
The positions of both sides are clear. Arguments for
supporting the Protocol include the significant increase in
the liability limit to approximately $130,000 per passen-
ger per incident plus up to $500 million per aircraft per
incident, compensation for both economic and non-eco-
nomic losses, incentives for quick settlement by the car-
rier, absolute liability on the part of the carrier, and
greater venue selection for the plaintiff. Arguments
against the Protocol include the mandatory surcharge for
the Supplemental Compensation Plan, the unbreakable
quality of the new liability limit with the elimination of the
willful misconduct exception, the questionable value of
continued protection for the mature airline industry, and
concerns about the impact of the liability protection on
the safety measures of the carriers.
The stalemate continues. At the end of the 102d Con-
gress, the full Senate still had not considered Montreal
Protocol 3 with its new Supplemental Compensation Plan.
Even if the Protocol is adopted, opponents will be dissat-
isfied with anything less than full denunciation of the
Warsaw Convention, and any liability limits will continue
to require revision as the economy changes. Meanwhile,
due to the inaction in the Senate, the $75,000 limitation,




established temporarily in 1966, on recovery for personal
injury or death incurred in an international air accident
continues to apply. In addition, the courts are applying a
stricter interpretation of the Convention to hold plaintiffs
to the liability limitations by closing doors to ways to
avoid them. By broadly construing the words "accident"
and "notice" to place the plaintiff under Warsaw, but nar-
rowly construing types of damages available and the be-
havior that constitutes willful misconduct, victims or their
survivors are bound by the $75,000 liability cap until
either Warsaw is denounced or Montreal Protocol 3 is
passed.
Those who oppose adopting Protocol 3 are instrumen-
tal in perpetuating the plan they abhor, the Warsaw Con-
vention scheme, as modified by the Montreal Agreement.
If they cannot get the votes to defeat Montreal Protocol 3
and to denounce the Warsaw Convention, why not show
present-day concern for the traveling public and adopt
the Protocol, which, today at least, offers compensation at
realistic levels? In the meantime, when traveling over-
seas, read your ticket carefully and purchase your own
supplemental insurance for additional protection.
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